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1. INTRODUCTION
The stock market has become an important part of our lives.
The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") estimates that in 1998, 84
million Americans, or 44% of the adult population, owned shares
of stock directly or through mutual funds or pension plans.' And
adults are not the only people who own shares. The New York
Times reports that 200,000 American teenagers may be speculating
in the stock market and that brokerage-firm officials are giving in-
vestment seminars to third graders, thus assuring the existence of
the next generation of investors.2 Stock market fever has also
spread to Europe, where many people who had previously put
their savings in bank accounts or real estate are now buying shares
of stock.3 During the past decade, the equity markets of the west-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School A.B., LLB., Harvard University. I
wish to thank my research assistant, Todd Doyle, Brooklyn Law School '02, for his
valuable contributions to this essay. I also express my gratitude to Jeffrey Knight,
former Chief Executive of the London Stock Exchange, for reviewing a draft of
this essay and giving me his valuable insights and suggestions. The opinions ex-
pressed, however, and any errors are my own.
1 Data collected by the NYSE showed that in 1998,34 million individuals di-
rectly owned shares in publicly traded companies, 27 million owned shares in eq-
uity mutual funds, 34 million owned shares through self-directed retirement
plans, and 48 million owned shares through defined contribution pension plans.
After accounting for the overlap among these four methods of ownership, the
NYSE estimated that 84 million individuals held shares of stock through at least
one of these channels, and 3 million hold stock through all four channels. NYSE,
SHAOW1WERSHIP 2000,10 (2000).
2 Randall Lane, In High School, Hallways Buzz With Stock Tips, N.Y. TIms, Jan.
14,2001, § 3, at 1.
3 For example, between 1997 and 2000 the number of shareholders in Ger-
many increased from 3.9 million to 6.2 million. Bettina Wassener, International
Capital Markets: Deutsche Bdrse to Put Prices Online, FIN. TIMss (London), Dec. 6,
2000, at 40.
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ern European companies have, for the first time, become an im-
portant factor in the economies of these countries.
As the world moves toward a global economy, the movement
of capital through the stock exchanges is no longer limited by na-
tional boundaries. The European stock exchanges are rushing
headlong to consolidate.4 The adoption of the euro as the common
currency of eleven of the countries in the European Union has
stimulated cross-border trading of securities by eliminating cur-
rency risks 5 The international investment banks and institutional
managers that control a large proportion of the flow of orders to
buy and sell securities are pushing the European national stock ex-
changes toward a Pan-European stock exchange, with the goals of
reducing transaction costs and enabling investors throughout
Europe to buy and sell stocks of leading European companies in a
single electronic market.6
Taking the notion of international consolidation one step fur-
ther, international investment banks and institutional investors en-
vision a unified market for the stocks of the world's largest com-
panies, which would be accessible to investors everywhere.7
Furthermore, the two largest American stock markets, the NYSE
and the Nasdaq over-the-counter market, i.e., the market for stocks
4 Terzah Ewing & Silvia Ascarelli, One World, How Many Stock Exchanges?,
WALL ST. J., May 15, 2000, at C1 (explaining the push toward global stock market
consolidation).
5 The consequences of eleven countries adopting the euro has been described
as follows:
[T]he creation of a currency shared by 11 countries is creating bigger and
more-liquid European stock and bond markets, including a junk-bond
market that is opening global financial markets to companies that were
never before welcomed. The maturing capital market is reducing the
cost of capital in Europe, liberating corporate borrowers from depend-
ence on banks, and making acquisitions much easier to finance.
G. Thomas Sims & David Wessel, The Euro: A Dismal Failure, a Ringing Success,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2000, at A29.
6 See Silvia Ascarelli, New Consolidation Wave Likely Will Hit European Ex-
changes, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2001, at C11; Vincent Boland, Heat is on to Create Pan-
Regional Market, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2000, at II (discussing potential con-
solidation of European stock exchanges); Nicholas George, 'Blue Chip Exchange is
Needed,' FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 18, 2000, at 26 (discussing the demand for a sin-
gle pan-European blue chip stock exchange).
7 Astrid Wendlandt, Winner Gets to Rule the World, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar.
31, 2000, at 5 ("For me, the end game will be the creation of a centralized stock
market that will trade the world's top 300 to 500 stocks.") (quoting Barry Mar-
shall, head of dealing at Gartmore Investment Management).
[Vol. 22:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss3/2
2001] STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE U.S. AND EUROPE 499
that are not listed on any exchange, appear to be moving toward
establishing links with European stock markets.8 In theory, a uni-
fied world stock market would enable pools of capital, wherever
they are to be found, to be directed into the most productive uses
available anywhere in the world, a result that should enhance effi-
ciency and productivity.
Faced with competition from a growing number of electronic
communications networks ("ECNs"), which are organized as busi-
ness corporations and are able to offer speedier execution of trans-
actions and lower costs, the world's stock exchanges have had to
reexamine their functions and their very identities.9 Traditionally,
stock exchanges were comfortable membership organizations,
which received a measure of protection from competition from
their national governments.10 Today, stock exchanges increasingly
see themselves as facilities for executing (and perhaps clearing and
settling) transactions, which must compete aggressively in offering
their services, not only with other exchanges, but with ECNs as
well. In fact, the world's stock exchanges, many of which have al-
s See Aline van Duyn, Bayan Rahman, & John Labate, Ten Stock Exchanges
Consider Alliance, FIN. TIMES (London), June 8, 2000, at I (stating that the NYSE is
in talks with stock exchanges in Europe, Asia, Canada, and Latin America to cre-
ate a global market where blue-chip stocks can be traded around the clock); Greg
Ip, Nasdaq Looks to Europe: Are Preparations A Prelude to a Bid for London Exchange?,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Ip, Nasdaq Looks to Europl] (discussing
Nasdaq's efforts to establish itself in Europe); John Labate & Vincent Boland,
Nasdaq Attempts to Lure London Excunge, FIN. TIMs (London), Dec. 16, 2000, at 16
(explaining the Nasdaq CEO's efforts to realize his vision of a twenty-four hour
global stock market).
9 Technology has led to advances in the way stock exchanges function.
Technology has made it possible for information regarding stock prices
to be sent all over the world in seconds. Presently, computers route or-
ders and execute small trades directly from the brokerage firm's terminal
to the exchange. Computers now link together various stock exchanges,
a practice which is helping to create a single global market for the trad-
ing of securities. The continuing improvements in technology will make
it possible to execute trades globally by electronic trading systems.
Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of Tecology on the Trading of Securi-
ties: the Emerging Global Market and the inplications for Regulation, 24 J. MASHALLL.
REV. 299,299 (1991).
10 See James K. Glassman, Manager's Journal: Wh Nceds Stock Exchanges? Not
Investors., WALL ST. J., May 8, 2000, at A42 ("Exchanges are at last being exposed
as anachronisms, sustained by inertia and by the desire of incumbents, with help
from regulators, to keep raking in monopoly rents. But the curtain is coming
down.").
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ready become for-profit business corporations, are transforming
themselves into ECNs.
This essay examines the structural and regulatory changes that
have already taken place, and that are currently taking place, in the
U.S. and European stock exchanges. These changes are dramatic,
and they are occurring with breathtaking speed. As in other in-
dustries, we are seeing the forces of consolidation and globaliza-
tion at work, made possible by a technology that has already en-
abled most of the world's stock exchanges to replace their trading
floors with ECNs. This essay also examines the institutional,
structural, and regulatory obstacles that inhibit movement toward
a world stock market.
2. THE STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
The world's two largest stock markets, measured by market
capitalization," are in the United States: the NYSE, with a market
capitalization of $12.4 trillion, and Nasdaq, with a market capitali-
zation of $3.6 trillion.12 Approximately 3,000 companies, of which
approximately 400 are foreign companies, have their common
stocks listed on the NYSE, while the stocks of approximately 5,000
companies are traded on Nasdaq.13 Technically speaking, the
Nasdaq market is not an exchange; it is an electronic market run by
the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), 14 the self-
regulatory organization that regulates the U.S. over-the-counter
market' 5s For purposes of this essay, however, Nasdaq may be
11 Market capitalization means the aggregate number of issued and out-
standing shares of common stock of companies that are listed on the exchange,
multiplied by the current market price of these shares. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN
ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 349 (5th ed.
1998).
12 SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 48 (2001).
13 Id.; see also NYSE FACT BOOK, 2000 DATA 42, 62 (2001) (providing NYSE sta-
tistics).
14 Unlike the NYSE and other U.S. exchanges, the NASD is registered with
the SEC as a national securities association, not as a national securities exchange.
However, the legal obligations imposed on exchanges and associations are com-
parable. See Securities Exchange Act §§ 6, 11A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78k-1 (1994) (list-
ing terms and conditions required for registration as a national securities ex-
change as well as legal obligations of securities information processors).
Is There is also a substantial amount of Nasdaq trading in stocks listed on the
NYSE. For example, on February 16,2001, of the total volume of trading in NYSE-
listed stocks of 1.48 billion shares, 1.26 billion shares, or 85.1%, were traded on the
NYSE and 106 million shares, or 7.2%, were traded on Nasdaq. The remaining
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considered an exchange, since its economic function- providing li-
quidity and setting securities prices-is identical to that of a stock
exchange. In fact, Nasda4 s trading system is similar to that of
some of the European stock exchanges, including the London Stock
Exchange ("LSE").16
The European exchanges no longer look anything like tradi-
tional stock exchanges. Unlike the major stock exchanges in the
United States, they have eliminated their trading floors in favor of
electronic trading. The colorful, noisy, and exciting atmosphere of
the trading floor, shown in countless movies and still photographs,
has given way to a less dramatic picture of people sitting at their
desks, watching screens, and punching keys on a keyboard. Also,
most of the European exchanges have demutualized; that is, they
have transformed themselves from membership organizations into
stock companies, and some of them have taken the additional step
of selling their shares to the public with plans to become listed
companies themselves.17
As of October 2000, the largest European stock exchange was
the LSE, with a market capitalization of $2.9 trillion. 8 More than
7.7% of the trading in NYSE-listed stocks was executed on five regional stock ex-
changes. A total of 1.85 billion shares were traded on Nasdaq that day. Mark'et
Indicators, N.Y. TIES, Feb. 17, 2001, at C4.
16 Nasdaq was established in 1971 as an electronic system for disseminating
bid and asked quotations of competing market-makers, but market participants
actually executed transactions by contacting each other over the telephone. Be-
ginning in 1984, however, Nasdaq has operated several trading systems that
automatically execute transactions. The principal trading systems used are the
Small Order Execution System ("SOES"), which is used to execute orders of up to
1,000 shares, and SelectNet, which can be used to execute orders of any size. See
JEFFREY W. SMTH ET. AL, THE NASDAQ STOCK 1MARET: HISrORICAL BACKGrOUND
AND CURRENT OPERATION 7, 32-36 (NASD Working Paper 93-01, 1998), at 7, 32-36,
available at http://www.academic.nasdaq.com/docs/wp98..1.pdf (discussing the
history, governance, operation, and future of Nasdaq operations).
17 As of October 2001, seven major stock exchanges are run by publicly
owned companies: London; Frankfurt, Stockholm; Hong Kong; Singapore; Aus-
tralia; and Euronext, the combined Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam exchange.
Vincent Boland, Takeover Premium Likely to Keep LSE Shares on a High, FIN. T.ms
(London), July 20, 2001, at 25; Raphael Minder, Flotation by Euronext to Raise
£700M, FIN. TMEs (London), July 5, 2001, at 28; DeutsdW B6rse Shares Jump, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at W1; see Bettina Wassener, Driving Ambition for a Listed Deut-
sche Be6rse, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 2001, at 32 [hereinafter Wassener, Driving
Ambition] (explaining company's ambition to consolidate European stock mar-
kets).
18 Federation of European Stock Exchanges, Information and Statistics, October
2000, Table 2, at http://wwv.fese.be/statisticshome.htm (last visited October 26,
2001) [hereinafter Federation of European Stock Exchunges].
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12,160 securities are traded on the LSE, which provides a market
for the stocks of many foreign companies as well as U.K. compa-
nies.19 In 1986, the LSE led the way towards the modernization of
the European stock exchanges by becoming the first major ex-
change to abandon the traditional trading floor in favor of elec-
tronic trading.20 Nevertheless, the LSE has stumbled in recent
years. Once the "king" of European exchanges, "[the LSE] has
blown what once appeared an unassailable lead through techno-
logical missteps and botched projects." 21 Unlike most of the other
European exchanges, it does not offer an integrated trading, dear-
ing, and settlement service, and its costs of trading are higher than
on other exchanges.22
The year 2000 was traumatic for the LSE. The exchange de-
mutualized, transforming itself from a member-owned organiza-
tion into a publicly-held company, whose shares are traded in the
over-the-counter market. Later in the year, the LSE and Deutsche
Bbrse, the company that owns the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, pro-
posed to merge.23 If the merger had been consummated, the re-
19 London Stock Exchange, Membership and Trading Services The Exchangk s
Market, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/trading/market /default.asp
(last visited Nov. 15, 2000).
20 See NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S
"BIG BANG" AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 47-49 (1991) [hereinafter
POSER, BIG BANG] (describing LSE's motives for switching to electronic trading);
David White, Predator Exchange that Became the Prey, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 20,
2000, at 12 (discussing a hostile cross-border takeover bid for the LSE, the aban-
donment of plans to merge with Frankfurt, insurgency among shareholders, and
the resignation of the LSE's chief executive).
21 Erik Portanger & Vanessa Fuhrmans, How It Became a Foggy Day on the Lon-
don Exchange, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2,2000, at C1.
Until European bourses began investing heavily in technology in the
early 1990s, Seaq International [the LSE's trading system] was the main
platform for international share trading. But the LSE stopped investing
in it and surrendered its market share without a fight- evidence of how
out of touch it has been since Big Bang.
Vincent Boland, Securing a Future, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 5,2001, at 22.
22 See Vincent Boland, A Share in the Future, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 18, 2000,
at 19 [hereinafter Boland, A Share in the Future] (exploring whether the LSE can
cast off conservatism to dominate pan-European trading).
23 See After iX, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 11, 2000, at 24 (discussing vague
future of exchanges if iX deal fails); Silvia Ascarelli & Vanessa Fuhrmans, LSE
Abandons Plan to Merge With Frankfurt, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2000, at A21 (discuss-
ing LSE's retreat from proposed merger); Silvia Ascarelli & James R. Hagerty,
London Stock Exchange Leaders Raked Over the Coals by Brokers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2000, at A17 (discussing anger of exchange owners stemming from failure of
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suiting market, which was to be named "iX," might well have ex-
panded into other countries and become a pan-European stock
market. It would probably have been dominated by Deutsche
BdSrse and its aggressive chief executive, Werner Seifert. Never-
theless, the iX merger would not have created an integrated market
for the securities traded on the two exchanges. Under the plan,
blue chip stocks would have been traded in London, while the
stocks of smaller growth companies would have been traded in
Frankfurt. In September 2000, however, the LSE abandoned the
proposed merger.24
The London-Frankfurt merger failed partly because several
LSE members were unwilling to lose the business of trading in
growth stocks, partly because the LSE managers were reluctant to
cede control of the exchange to Deutsche B6rse, and partly because
of the incompatibility of German and U.K regulations.23 Follow-
ing the collapse of the merger, OM Gruppen, a Swedish company
that operates the Stockholm Stock Exchange, made a $1.19 billion
bid to take over the LSE, but this too failed because of opposition
from the LSE's shareholders.26 Although the LSE's management
merger efforts); James R. Hagerty & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Pan-European Stock-
Market Plans Shaky, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2000, at A19 (exploring shareholder dis-
approval of proposed merger).
24 Ascarelli & Fuhrmans, supra note 23, at A21.
25 Vincent Boland & Francesco Guerrera, FSA Staff Brand iX Plan 'A Night-
mare,' FIN. TIMES (London), Sept 8, 2000, at 1; Francesco Guerrera & Aline van
Duyn, Unsinkable Merger Now Titanic of Big Deals, FIN. TIMEs (London), Sept. 13,
2000, at 5. Following the demise of the iX merger, shareholders "berate[d] the
LSE's board and call[ed] for senior officials to resign." Ascarelli & Hagerty, supra
note 23, at A17. In January 2001, the LSE appointed as its new chief executive, a
former commodities trader (and a woman) and replaced several members of its
governing board with persons from outside the financial industry. These moves
were seen by many as reflecting a desire by the exchange to break with its tradi-
tional past. See Silvia Ascarelli, London Bourse is Set to Trade Tradition For Neutral-
ity, Naming Outsider as CEO, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2001, at A17 (discussing the ap-
pointment of Clara Furse as CEO of the London Stock Exchange); Silvia Ascarelli,
London Bourse Veers Further From Bankers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2001, at A16 (dis-
cussing appointment of Clara Purse as CEO of the LSE and the replacement of
four nonexecutive members of the LSE's management board with nonbankers);
Vincent Boland, A Single-Minded Manager, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 27,2001, at 11
(stating that the first female CEO of the LSE, Clara Furse is "one tough woman
and she will need to "combine that with a sense of strategy").
For more on the proposed merger and its aftermath, see After iX, supra note
23, at 24; Ascarelli & Fuhrmans, upra note 23, at A21; Ascarelli & Hagerty, supra
note 23, at A17; Hagerty & Fuhrmans, supra note 23, at A19.
26 Erik Portanger, Exchange in London Now in Play, WAL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2000,
at A18; see Silvia Ascarelli, Swedes Set Formal Bid for the LSE, WALLST. J., Sept. 12,
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expressed a determination to keep the exchange independent, ru-
mors of foreign entities interested in acquiring the exchange were
fueled by dissension between the exchange's management and its
shareholders, most of whom are brokerage firms.27
Euronext, with a market capitalization of $2.4 trillion, is the
second largest European exchange. This new exchange reflects the
Paris Bourse's effort to direct and control the development of a
pan-European securities market, and to create a single market for
equities, options, derivatives, and commodities.28 Euronext is the
result of a September 2000 merger of the Paris, Amsterdam, and
Brussels exchanges.29 Euronext claims to be the first integrated
European stock and derivatives market. It has a centralized, order-
driven trading system and a central clearing organization, which
not only will clear and settle transactions on a net basis, but will
also guarantee their performance. However, stocks will be divided
into four groups, according to the size of their capitalization and
amount of trading activity, and each group will be traded some-
what differently.30 Euronext estimates that it will accomplish cost
savings "to Euro 50 million a year mainly from savings in infor-
2000, at A21 (discussing the LSE's rejection of OM's offer); Vincent Boland, LSE
Sees Off OM's Takeover Attempt, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 11, 2000, at 1 (talking
about keeping the LSE independent after shareholders rejected a possile takeover
by OM Group).
27 Silvia Ascarelli, London Bourse Has Long Row To Hoe as Bid By OM Lapses,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2000, at A15; Vincent Boland, LSE Chairman 'Doubts Prospect'
of Merger, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 26, 2000, at 2; Vincent Boland, LSE to 'Go-it-
Alone'for Trading Shares in Europe, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 20, 2000, at 25; Vin-
cent Boland & John Labate, Nasdaq Steps Up Pressure on LSE, FIN. TIMES (London),
Dec. 14, 2000, at 26; Nicholas George, OM Group Wants to Renew Offer for LSE, FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 22, 2000, at 24; Hagerty & Fuhrmans, supra note 23, at A19
(discussing potential buyers of the LSE); James R. Hagerty, Charles Goldsmith, &
John Carreyou, New Suitors Are Circling U.K. Bourse, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2000, at
A25; Ip, Nasdaq Looks to Europe, supra note 8, at Cl; Portanger, supra note 26, at
A18; see also Vincent Boland, LSE Rift on Chief Executive, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec.
20, 2000, at 27 (discussing the potential for a further delay in the appointment of a
new chief executive due to LSE directors' disagreement).
28 See Samer Iskandar, Paris Bids for Europe's Crown, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov.
10, 2000, at I (depleting the modernization of French capitalism as France's blue-
chip companies create a platform to challenge their European rivals).
29 Federation of European Stock Exchanges, supra note 18 (stating that euros have
been converted into dollars at the current rate of exchange).
30 Euronext, Euronext Comprehensive Paper, at http://www.euronext.com/nl
/euronextinfo/publications/comprehensive-paper/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2001)
[hereinafter Euronext Comprehensive Paper].
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mation technology."3 ' A demutualized stock exchange, Euronext
made a public offering of its own shares in July 2001.3 2
A broker who has been admitted to membership in any of Eu-
ronext's three component exchanges will have access to all prod-
ucts traded in the Euronext market. Trading regulations and list-
ing requirements of the three exchanges will be harmonized. A
broker licensed in one market "will automatically receive a pass-
port to operate in another Euronext country as well." Neverthe-
less, a brokerage firm which participates in the Euronext market
will continue to be subject to the supervision of the regulator of the
country in which it was granted its license. Euronext envisages
extending its operations to other European exchanges, with the
goal of becoming the nucleus of a single financial market for the
countries of the European Union.33
The Frankfurt Stock Exchange, with a market capitalization of
$1.4 trillion, is Europe's third largest exchange 4 The exchange is
owned by Deutsche Bbrse ("DB"), whose principal shareholder is
Deutsche Bank. DB also operates the Neuer Markt, a market for
the stocks of high-growth companies. In addition, DB and the
Swiss Exchange jointly own Eurex, the world's largest futures
market 35 DB also licenses its Xetra electronic trading system to
31 Euronext, In Brief, at http://www.euronexLcom/en/euronext/in-brief/
(last visited Oct. 13,2001) [hereinafter Euronext History].
32 See Minder, supra note 17, at 28.
3 Euronext Comprehensive Paper, supra note 30. Euronext announced that it
intended "to interconnect the trading systems of [the NYSE, Australian Stock Ex-
change and the exchanges of Tokyo, Toronto, Mexico, and Sao Paulo] to form a
transparent market with one single orderbook." Euronext History, supra note 31;
see also Philip Davis, Three Goes into One Excunge, FiN. TIMES (London), Nov. 21,
2000, at 5 ("Euronext sees itself as a 'consolidator' ... ."); Deborah Hargreaves,
Europe: Plea on Single Financial Market, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 8, 2000, at 11
("The European Commission will ... call for countries to make a 'quantum leap'
by agreeing measures to complete the single financial market by 2005.").
The Warsaw Stock Exchange, whose trading system uses the same technol-
ogy as Euronext, is considering a plan to establish a linkage with that exchange.
John Reed, Warsaw Bourse Considers Two Alliances, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 19,
2001, at 20.
34 Federation of European Stock Exchanges, supra note 18 ( discussing how euros
have been converted into dollars at the current rate of exchange).
3 See Iskandar, supra note 28, at I (emphasizing Eurex's position as the
world's largest derivatives market); Eurex, The World's Leading Derivatives Ex-
change, at http://www.eurexchange.com/index2.html?eh&l&entrancehali/about
_mission_en.html (last visited OcL 13, 2001) (asserting that Eurex is the world's
leading derivatives exchange).
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other exchanges.36 In 2000, DB joined with Wiener B6rse, the Vi-
ennese exchange, to establish Newex, a new electronic stock ex-
change, which is aimed at capturing a slice of the trading in Polish,
Czech, and Hungarian stocks.3 7 In February 2001, DB became a
publicly owned company through a successful offering of its
shares3 8 Although the merger with the LSE fell through, DB is
considered by many to be Europe's most dynamic stock ex-
change.3 9
After London, Euronext, and Frankfurt, the other leading
European stock exchanges are the Italian Exchange, with a market
capitalization of $806 billion, and the Swiss Exchange, with a mar-
ket capitalization of $791 billion.40 Another potentially important
factor in the European securities markets is OM Group, a Swedish
company that controls the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Although
OM Group failed in its bid to take over the LSE, it created Norex in
1999. Norex is a strategic combination of the Stockholm and Co-
penhagen exchanges, which became the world's first cross-border
equity market operating under common rules and a common
trading system. Furthermore, under OM Group's leadership,
36 Hoover's Online, Deutsche B6rse AG, at http://www.hoovers.com/uk/co
/capsule/5/,2163,100725,00.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Deutsche
B6rse AG].
37 John Reed et al., Unified Trading Faces Battle to JustifiJ Worth, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 2,2000, at 43.
38 Silvia Ascarelli, Deutsche Boerse Stages its IPO; Shares Climb 11% in First Ses-
sion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2001, at C20; Bettina Wassener, Deutsche Bdrse Climbs 10%
on Opening Day, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 2001, at 19; Bettina Wassener, Deut-
sche B6rse IPO in Demand, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 5,2001, at 15.
39 Nevertheless, after the failure of the proposed merger with the LSE, Deut-
sche Bbrse has, at least for the time being, abandoned its ambition of being the nu-
cleus of a pan-European market. Instead, it is concentrating on acting "as the op-
erator- but not owner- of smaller national stock exchanges .... " Silvia Ascarelli,
German Bourse Cuts Back Plans As Net Doubles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at A19;
see also Vincent Boland, Deutsche Birse Puts Sentiment on New Issue Market to the
Test, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 2, 2001, at 29 (raising concerns regarding Deutsche
Barse's ability to strike agreement with its global partners); Wassener, Driving
Ambition, supra note 17, at 24 (commenting upon the failure to merge the Frank-
furt Exchange and the London Stock Exchange and evaluating its effect upon the
Deutsche Barse); Bettina Wassener & Vincent Boland, Deutsche Bdrse Chief Awaits
Chance to Test the Market, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 18, 2001, at 29 (debating the
feasibility of Deutsche Birse's alleged plans regarding consolidation of the Euro-
pean Stock Exchange).
40 Federation of European Stock Exchanges, supra note 18 (discussing how euros
have been converted into dollars at the current rate of exchange).
[Vol. 22:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss3/2
2001] STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE U.S. AND EUROPE 507
Norex promises to become the nucleus of a broader Nordic ex-
change.41
3. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS NETWoRmS
The late 1990s saw the appearance of several ECNs, both in the
United States and in Europe, which promised to compete with the
established securities markets by offering cheaper, quicker, and
more efficient execution of transactions than could be effected on
an organized stock exchange. 42 ECNs are similar to stock ex-
changes, in that they are designed to allow buyers and sellers to
meet and are operated by a third party.43 By September 1999, an
estimated thirty percent of the trading in securities admitted to the
Nasdaq system, and four percent of the trading in exchange-listed
securities, was done on ECNs. 44 The competitiveness of ECNs in
listed securities is likely to be enhanced by the NYSE s repeal, in
2000, of its Rule 390, which severely limited the ability of member
firms to trade in listed stocks off the exchange.45
41 Copenhagen Stock Exchange, Membership, at http://www.xcse.dk/
uk/marked/medlemskab/index.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2001). In market capi-
talization, Norex is the the fifth largest equity market. Id. The stock exchanges of
Norway, Iceland, and the Baltic countries have expressed their intent to join
Norex, and Finland has been invited to join. Clare MacCarthy, Team Spirit Brings
Gains All Round, FiN. TIMES (London), Oct. 31,2000, at 4.
42 In late 1999, there were nine ECNs in the United States, the largest (and
oldest) of which, Instinet, accounted for fifty percent of the shares that traded on
ECNs. The next largest after Instinet was Island, which accounted for twenty per-
cent, and then Archipelago, which accounted for eight percent. Rethinking IWall
Street, Bus. Wiy, Oct 11, 1999, at 146.
43 See SmNnH Er AL, supra note 16, at 36 (discussing how alternaive trading
systems are similar to exchanges). In its recent releases, the Department of Eco-
nomic Research uses the term "alternative trading system" ("ATS"), which refers
both to ECNs and to other types of trading systems that provide facilities for
matching buy and sell orders "but do not widely or continuously disseminate ac-
cessible firm orders." Id. at 38; see also Regulation of Exchanges and Alternatie Trad-
ing Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40760, 1998 WL 849348 (Dec. 8, 199S)
[hereinafter Regulation of Exchanges) (providing rules to incorporate alternative
trading systems into the national market system).
44 See Michael Schroeder & Greg Ip, Levitt Urges Central Market To Price Stacks,
WALL ST., J., Sept. 24,1999, at Al ("ECNs account for about 30% of the volume of
Nasdaq trading but an insignificant share of Big Board trading partly because of
rules limiting trading Big Board away from a stock exchange.").
45 Rule 390 prohibited NYSE members from trading in listed stocks in the
over-the-counter market, but not on another stock exchange. See Self Regulatory
Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc., Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change to Rescind Exchange Rule 390, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42758, 2000
WL 649013 (May 5,2000). Since most ECNs in the United States are not registered
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In March 2000, one American ECN, Archipelago (founded in
1997) announced that it would merge with the Pacific Exchange
("PCX"), a national securities exchange registered with the SEC.
The merger contemplated that Archipelago, which was trading a
daily average of 50 million shares in March 2000, would acquire
the stock-trading business of the PCX, with an average daily vol-
ume of 23 million shares, and that PCX would provide regulatory
and management services.46 This new market will combine fea-
tures of an ECN with those of a traditional stock exchange. As
planned, buy and sell orders will be matched electronically, giving
time and price to the orders as they are entered, but market-makers
will continue to participate in the market by trading for their own
account in order to improve prices.47
Although ECNs have been established in Europe, their inroads
into the business of the stock exchanges are less advanced than in
the United States. One reason for this is the fact that the European
exchanges themselves operate electronic trading markets. Trade-
point, an ECN that began its trading operations in 1995, is regis-
tered as a Recognized Investment Exchange in the United King-
dom, and this registration permits it to operate throughout Europe
under the Investment Services Directive of the European Union.48
In 1999, the SEC granted Tradepoint an exemption, on account of
its limited trading volume, from the registration requirements of
the 1934 Act.49 Thus, Tradepoint became the first foreign exchange
as national securities exchanges, transactions executed on them are not considered
stock exchange transactions. For a discussion of Rule 390 and its background, see
Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's Na-
tional Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 931-41 (1981) [hereinafter Poser, Re-
structuring the Stock Markets].
46 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change
by the Pacific Exchange, Inc. and Amendment No. 1 Thereto Relating to the Ar-
chipelago Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 34-43608, 2000 WL 1730888 (Nov.
21, 2000); Greg Ip, Archipelago to Set Up New Stock Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15,
2000, at C1. As of February 2001, however, the SEC had not approved the rule
changes that would be necessary to effect the merger. PCX Concerned About SEC
Moratorium on Rulemaking Delaying E-Exchange, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 164
(Feb. 5, 2001) [hereinafter PCX Concerned About SEC Moratorium].
47 John Labate, Hoping to Leapfrog the Regulators, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 31,
2000, at 7.
48 Virt-x, FAQ, at http://www.tradepoint'co.uk/index.html (last visited Oct.
13, 2001) [hereinafter Tradepoint].
49 Tradepoint Financial Networks PLC: Order Granting Limited Volume Ex-
emption from Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities Ex-
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to be granted permission to operate in the United States and to
give American institutional investors direct access to the European
markets.5 0
At the beginning of 2000, Tradepoint had a worldwide mem-
bership of about 150, consisting of fund managers, market-makers,
traders, and brokers. Members can access Tradepoint directly and
can trade in the shares of about 2,000 companies listed on the LSE
and other stock exchanges of the European Union.?' In addition,
Tradepoint has joined with the Swiss Stock Exchange to create a
new exchange, called Virt-x, based in London, for trading in Swiss
blue-chip stocks and the clearing and settlement of these transac-
tions.52 Tradepoint is controlled by a consortium of eleven inves-
tors, including investment banks, such as J.P. Morgan and Merrill
Lynch, and other ECNs, such as Archipelago.
Another European ECN is Jiway, which was established in
2000 jointly by OM Group, the Swedish company that controls the
Stockholm exchange, and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. Jiway
plans eventually to trade and settle transactions in about 6,000 U.S.
and European stocks. 3 When Jiway began operations in Novem-
ber 2000, it initially offered investors the opportunity to trade in
180 U.K., French, and German blue chips, but had plans to expand
quickly. Like Tradepoint, Jiway is a Recognized Investment Ex-
change in the U.K., a status that enables it to operate throughout
the European Union. 4
Thus far, the impact of ECNs on the stock exchanges has been
relatively slight Potentially, however, they are a force to be reck-
change Act, Exchange Act Release No. 34-41199, 1999 SEC Lexis 612 (Mar. 22,
1999).
50 The terms of the exemption granted to Tradepoint by the SEC require that
bids and offers may be made generally in the United States only in securities that
are registered under the 1934 Act. Bids and offers for other securities may be
made to qualified institutional buyers, international agencies, and non-US. per-
sons. Id. at *10.
Tradepoint, supra note 48.
52 Vincent Boland, Suwiss Exchange Set to Move Blue Chip Trading to London
Base, FIN. TIMiEs (London), July 11, 2000, at 27. In June 2001, the SEC staff permit-
ted Virt-X to extend trading privileges to U.S. members. See 33 See. Reg. & L Rep.
(BNA) 1027 (July 9,2001).
re In September 2001, Morgan Stanley sold its 40% interest in Jiway to OM
Group, leaving the latter with full control. See Christopher Brown-Humes, Jiway
Thrown Lifeline as OM Takes Control, FIN. TMES (London), Sept. 28,2001, at 27.
54 Jiway Ltd., Jiway Limited and the Market Place, at http://www.jiway.com/
insidejiway/aboutjiway/jiwayltd.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2001).
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oned with. It is significant that, by and large, the ECNs are owned
and controlled by large international investment banks, which
have the ability to channel their institutional customers' orders to
the market that offers the greatest liquidity and the lowest cost.55
Some of these banks have invested in more than one ECN, thus
hedging their bets as to who will control the future world stock
market that they envision. Although the market share that the
ECNs have taken away from the stock exchanges thus far is rela-
tively slight, their very existence conveys an urgent warning mes-
sage to the stock exchanges from their most important customers:
become competitive in terms of cost, speed, and efficency, or we
will send our orders, and those of our customers, to an ECN.
4. WHAT STOCK EXCHANGES Do
Stock exchanges are a highly visible symbol of a market econ-
omy. Every nation worth its salt-even Communist China-has at
least one, and some have more than one.56 In the past, although
the legal status of stock exchanges was different from country to
country, the exchanges were permitted to engage in various kinds
of anti-competitive practices. National governments protected
practices such as fixing the commission rates that members
charged the public and placing restrictions on who could become
exchange members.57 Beginning in the 1970s, under pressure from
the growing power of institutional investors, principally mutual
funds and pension funds, and the consequent unwillingness of
governments to tolerate the aforementioned practices, the stock ex-
changes were opened to competition. "May Day" in the United
States in 1975 and "Big Bang" in the United Kingdom in 1986
55 For example, the consortium that controls Tradepoint includes the ECNs
Archipelago and Instinet and the investment banks Credit Suisse First Boston,
Deutsche Bank (the largest shareholder of Deutsche Bbrse), Chase J.P. Morgan,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and UBS Warburg. Tradepoint, supra
note 48.
56 See, e.g., Vincent Boland, World's Bourses Jostle for Position as Upstarts Elbow
In, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2000, at I [hereinafter Boland, Bourses Jostle] (ex-
plaining that ECNs are a threat to stock exchanges); MacCarthy, supra note 41, at 4
(comparing the stock exchanges of Nordic nations); Richard McGregor, China Sets
its Sights on Stock Market Efficiency, FIN. TIMEs (London), Jan. 26, 2001, at 19
(showing government regulation of the Chinese stock market); Elizabeth William-
son, Warsaw Exchange Looks Westward for Expansion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000, at
B12C (stating that Europe's post-communist landscape has several national, re-
gional, and even city stock exchanges).
57 POSER, BIG BANG, supra note 20, at 12-20.
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marked the end of fixed commission rates and restrictive member-
ship. 8 The countries of continental Europe soon followed the lead
of New York and London.5 9
Beginning in the 1990s and moving into the twenty-first cen-
tury, new pressures from the development of technology, com-
bined with a new competitive atmosphere, have led to a partial
unbundling of the variety of different functions that stock ex-
changes have traditionally performed. For example, the leading
European stock exchanges have demutualized; they have ceased to
be membership organizations and become proprietary, profit-
making corporations. Stock exchanges have begun to engage in
cross-border mergers or alliances with other stock exchanges or
with ECNs. These developments have left the exchanges with
something like an identity crisis. What is their proper role in the
economy? Who are their competitors? More fundamentally, what,
today, is a stock exchange?
The traditional functions of a stock exchange were as follows:
4.1. Operate Trading Markets
Financial markets are vital to the health of an economy. The
primary function of these markets is to allocate capital. They move
capital from savers to those who have productive uses for capital
(i.e., opportunities to invest and to receive high returns)." Finan-
cial markets are divided into two distinct parts. The first part is the
new issue market, where companies raise capital by issuing secu-
rities to the public, typically through syndicates of investment
banking firms acting as underwriters and dealers. The second part
is the trading market, where these securities may be bought and
sold after their issuance.
Stock exchanges are trading markets.61 The principal economic
function of a stock exchange is to create liquidity-"the ability to
5m Id. at 14-18, 27-32.
5 See White, supra note 20, at12 ("London's Big Bang reforms of 19S6 opened
a trail of liberalisation across continental exchanges.").
60 Lucy F. Ackert & Bryan K Church, Compeitireness and Price Seting in
Dealer Markets, FED. REs. BANK Op ATLANTA EcON. REv. 5,5 (Third Quarter 1993).
61 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 3(a)(1), 15 US.C. § 78(c)(a)(1)
(1994), defines "exchange" as an entity that "provides a market place or facilities
for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise per-
forming with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a stock
exchange as that term is generally understood ...."
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buy or sell an asset quickly and in large volume without substan-
tially affecting the asset's price." 62 For the sale of a new issue of se-
curities to succeed, prospective purchasers require a reasonable as-
surance of liquidity in the future.63 A well-functioning stock
exchange provides assurance to investors that they will be able to
enter and exit the market whenever they need to, or when it suits
their convenience. 64 Today, "[e]ach exchange is involved in a bitter
struggle with every other exchange for that most precious of finan-
cial commodities: liquidity. If an exchange loses it... it is dead."65
Closely related to the stock exchanges' function of providing
liquidity is the fact that they are price-setting mechanisms. An ef-
ficient stock market facilitates price discovery, enabling prices to
quickly reflect information and reveal this information to market
participants and other interested observers.66 By establishing secu-
rities prices, stock exchanges enable securities to be used as collat-
eral for loans, determine the price at which a company is able to is-
sue additional securities, and provide a basis for the valuation of
securities for taxation and other purposes.67
In 1998, the SEC adopted a rule defining an "exchange" as an organization,
association, or group of persons that:. (1) brings together the orders of multiple
buyers and sellers; and (2) uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether
by providing a trading facility or by setting rules) for such orders to interact with
each other. Specifically excluded from the definition of "exchange" are trading
systems that perform only traditional broker-dealer activities. These are: (1) sys-
tems that merely route orders to other facilities for execution; (2) systems operated
by a single registered market-maker to display its own bids and offers and the
limit orders of its customers; and (3) systems that allow persons to enter orders for
execution against the bids and offers of a single dealer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-16
(2001); Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 43, at 23.
62 DowNES & GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 329.
63 Liquidity also is supplied by the trading desks of investment banking
firms, which support the prices of securities that the firms have underwritten, as a
service to their customers who have purchased the securities. Daniel K. Orlow,
Market Structure: How 'Wall Street' Works, 21 J. RETAIL BANKING SERV. 57-58 (Spring
1999).
64 See Ackert & Church, supra note 60, at 5 (stating that a well-functioning se-
curities market allows investors to enter and exit when necessary).
65 Charles Cox & Douglas C. Michael, The Market for Markets: Development of
International Securities and Commodities Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 833, 834 (1987)
(quoting Clements, A Whale of a Sales Drive, EUROMONEY, May 1986, at 176).
66 See Ackert & Church, supra note 60, at 5 (stating that in an effective securi-
ties market, prices quickly reflect information and reveal this news to market ob-
servers and participants).
67 See Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets, supra note 45, at 886 (arguing that
because markets are price setting mechanisms, they facilitate the use of securities
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Stock exchanges perform the highly useful function of enabling
individuals to transfer their consumption throughout their life cy-
des.68 By setting securities prices, stock exchanges also create a
way of measuring wealth. As we have seen in recent years, high
stock prices give people a feeling of wealth and encourage spend-
ing, thereby increasing the demand for goods and services, stimu-
lating investment, and fueling the economy.69 This "wealth effect,"
however, is not without its problems. As Chairman Alan
Greenspan of the Federal Reserve Board warned in January 2000:
Productivity-driven supply growth has, by raising long-
term profit expectations, engendered a huge gain in equity
prices. Through the so-called "wealth effect," these gains
have tended to foster increases in aggregate demand be-
yond the increases in supply. It is this imbalance between
growth of supply and growth of demand that contains the
potential seeds of rising inflationary and financial pressures
that could undermine the current expansion 0
Whether or not it is seen as being beneficial, the linkage be-
tween the stock market and the economy is twofold: stock prices
reflect economic conditions, and they also affect them.
Although creating and operating securities markets is their
primary function, stock exchanges are complex organizations that
have traditionally performed four other roles.
as collateral, determine the price at which a company can issue additional securi-
ties, and establish a basis for valuation).
6s See Ackert & Church, supra note 60, at 5 (arguing that "financial markets
also permit individuals to transfer consumption across time.").
69 During the stock market boom of the late 1990s, there was considerable
public discussion of the "wealth effect" on the economy caused by rising stock
prices. See Eileen Kinsella, The Wealtlh E fect: Greenspan Factors Bull Market into
Fed's Soft-Landing Calculations, The Streetcom, at http://wivw.abcnews.go.com
/sections/business/TheStreet/wealtheffect000229.html (last modified Mar. 3,
2000) (explaining that the Federal Reserve hoped to counter the wealth effect
without severely impacting stock calculations).
70 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Technology and the Economy,
Address Before the Economic Club of New York (an. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20001132.htm (last
visited Oct. 13,2001).
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4.2. Clear and Settle Transactions
Many stock exchanges (or organizations affiliated with them)
clear and settle securities transactions after they have been exe-
cuted.7' The clearing function performed by the clearing house
consists of three steps: first, it "compares" the buyer's order with
that of the seller to confirm that they agree on the terms of the
trade; second, it "clears" the transaction by informing the parties of
their payment and delivery obligations; and, third, it "settles" the
transaction by delivering the securities to the buyer and transfer-
ring cash in payment to the seller72 The success or failure of a
71 The functions of a clearing agency have been described as follows:
When two brokers agree on the floor of an exchange, or over the counter
(i.e., usually, over the telephone), to a buy-sell transaction for their cli-
ents, the actual transaction has only begun. Thereafter, several steps
must be taken to complete the course of dealing. These steps are typi-
cally the responsibility of a clearing agency, one of which traditionally
has been linked to each of the national and regional exchanges, and one
of which has served the over-the-counter market.
The clearing agency has three functions. First, the agency "compares"
submissions of the seller's broker with those of the buyer's to make sure
that there is a common understanding of the terms of the trade. Follow-
ing this process, the resulting "compared trade" is "cleared." Most sim-
ply, this amounts to the clearing agency advising the selling and buying
brokers, respectively, of their delivery and payment obligations. The
system becomes far more complicated -although, with the help of com-
puters, also more efficient- insofar as the clearing agency attempts, for a
given period of time, to net all of a broker's transactions in each security
as well as all of his monetary obligations. By this means, and by making
all rights and duties run between the broker on either side of the trans-
action and the clearing agency, rather than between the brokers them-
selves, each broker is reduced to making or receiving one delivery for
each security traded, and one cash payment, per day. In addition to re-
ducing transactions costs, this latter method of clearing, referred to as
"continuous netting," eases the risk to each broker and his client that the
other party will become insolvent or otherwise fail to complete the trans-
action. The final, "settlement," stage in the process involves the delivery
of securities certificates to the purchasing broker and the payment of
money to the selling broker. Modernization of this task has led to stor-
age of most stock certificates in a depository affiliated with the clearing
agency. Thus, "delivery" amounts to a bookkeeping entry that removes
the security from one account and places it in another.
The breakdown in these processes during the late 1960's largely ante-
dated, and supplied the impetus for, the modem computerization and
netting trends.
Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085,1091 n.2 (11th Cir. 1978).
72 Id.
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stock exchange may depend on its ability to perform, at a reason-
able cost, the essential back-office operations without which the fi-
nancial system cannot function. 3 Following the back-office crisis
of the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the major se-
curities exchanges joined forces to create the National Securities
Clearing Corporation, a highly integrated and sophisticated clear-
ing and settlement system, which today clears transactions in three
business days. Settlement is on a "net" basis, in the sense that each
broker's receipts and deliveries of securities and transfers of cash
are "netted," so as to reduce the number of deliveries and trans-
fers. Furthermore, most transfers are done electronically, thus re-
ducing the necessity to move millions of pieces of paper around
every business day.74 In Europe, the stock exchanges have tradi-
tionally had their own clearing and settlement arrangements, and
the processing of transactions has been more expensive than in the
United States.T Reduction of processing costs in order to attract
and stimulate securities business has been a powerful spur to the
consolidation of the European exchanges.76
Some clearing houses perform an additional related function:
they guarantee the performance of transactions, thereby relieving
the buying and selling brokers and their customers of the risk that
the party on the other side will not perform. After a transaction is
executed, the clearing house accepts the obligation of the opposite
party to the transaction and becomes the counter-party, both to the
buyer and to the seller. By stepping between the buyer and the
seller, the clearing house performs an additional function: it en-
ables the parties to the transaction to remain anonymous. In the
United States, the Options Clearing Corporation, which is the
clearing house for the options markets, acts as a guarantor, but the
73 Boland, Bourses Jostle, supra note 56, at I.
74 See DAVID M. WEiss, AFTER Tm TRADE Is MADE 69-70, 309-10, 356-53 (2d ed.
1993) (outlining some of the back-office operations that are necessary to complete
a transaction).
73 See Boland, Bourses Jostle, supra note 56, at I (elucidating the threats to
European stock exchanges and the appropriate present and future response).
76 See White, supra note 20, at 12. Two international clearing houses, Euro-
dear and Cedel, that were created under the auspices of investment banking firms
in the 1970s to process bond transactions, have begun to clear and settle equity
transactions, in association with European stock exchanges. Euroclear has
merged with the settlement operation of the Paris Bourse, while Cedel has merged
with Deutsche B6rse's clearing house to form Clearstream. Aline van Duyn,
European Links Push Exchange Towards US Costs, FIN. TIMEs (London), Sept. 1, 20,
at 9.
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clearing houses for transactions in stocks do not. Some European
clearing houses, however, act as guarantors and counter-parties in
both the stock and the options markets.77
4.3. Represent Ther Members
Stock exchanges traditionally are membership organizations,
whose members are brokerage firms and individual brokers and
dealers. Most stock exchanges limit the number of their members
and restrict access to the facilities of the exchange to persons who
have been admitted to membership.78 They have often been de-
scribed as private clubs because of their exclusive membership and
because their primary concern has often been to protect and ad-
vance their members' interests, and to represent these interests be-
fore the government, other groups, and the public.79 Sometimes,
the interests of the members clash with those of the investing pub-
lic, and government controls have been seen as necessary to protect
investors and the public interest.8 0
As will be discussed later, the recent trend has been for stock
exchanges to demutualize, i.e., to turn themselves into business
corporations, which are owned by their shareholders. In addition,
after demutualizing, some of the principal European exchanges
77 The three exchanges comprising Euronext, the Paris, Brussels, and Am-
sterdam stock exchanges, have a central clearing organization that guarantees the
performance of transactions. Euronext Comprehensive Paper, supra note 30, at 11.
78 In the United States, the 1934 Act permits a stock exchange to limit the
number of its members, but not to decrease the number of its members below the
number in effect on May 1, 1975. Securities Exchange Act § 6(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. §
78f(c)(4) (1994).
79 "For generations, stock exchanges were cosy clubs run by elites of institu-
tions for other institutional elites." Boland, Bourses Jostle, supra note 56, at I.
80 In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Supreme Court
held that a stock exchange had an implied exemption from the antitrust laws, but
only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to
the minimum extent necessary. Id. at 364-65. In that case, the exchange had pro-
hibited its members from doing business with a non-member brokerage firm.
Since NYSE members dominate the securities business in the United States, the
effect of the exchange's action was effectively to put the non-member firm out of
business. The exchange gave no reasons for its action and offered no opportunity
for the firm to be heard. Nor did the Exchange Act give the SEC authority to in-
tervene. The Court held that the exchange had violated the Sherman Act. In 1975,
Congress amended the Act to require stock exchanges to provide fair procedures
and to enable stock exchange actions to be reviewed by the SEC. See Securities
Exchange Act §§ 6(b)(7) & 19(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(7) & 78s( (providing rules
concerning exchange membership and for review of the denial of membership).
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have made public offerings of their stock, and the major U.S. ex-
changes are considering taking similar steps.X Demutualization
and going public are likely to reduce or even to end the role that
stock exchanges play as membership organizations.
4.4. Regulate Their Members and Listed Companies
Since the nineteenth century, the stock exchanges have acted as
regulators.82 They require their members to obey rules governing
their conduct in connection with their activities on the stock ex-
change. To some extent the regulatory role is inevitable, since the
operation of a market requires that the participants play by com-
mon rules and that these rules be enforced. Stock exchanges, how-
ever, also regulate the selling practices, financial responsibilities,
and other aspects of their members' activities, even where these
activities are not directly related to transactions executed on the
stock exchange.P Some stock exchanges also regulate the compa-
nies whose securities are admitted to trading, including such mat-
ters as capital structure, voting rights, and disclosure policies.P
Today, the regulatory activities of most stock exchanges are super-
vised by government agencies. Thus, although the United States
and several European countries have self-regulatory systems, self-
regulation is almost invariably subject to some form of government
supervision.
4.5 Collect and Distribute Infonnation
Stock exchanges collect and publish market information, prin-
cipally quotations and limit orders (i.e., the prices at which profes-
sional market-makers and public investors are willing to buy and
sell securities), and the prices of completed transactions. Public ac-
8 See supra text accompanying notes 23,32,38, and infra note 161.
82 In 1868, the NYSE began requiring its listed companies to submit financial
reports to the exchange. See NORMAN S. POSER, BROkER-DEALER LAW ND
REGULATION 13-5 (3d ed. Supp. 2001) [hereinafter POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW].
83 For example, NYSE regulation of its members' advertising and sales li-
terature is not limited to communications about NYSE-listed stocks. Sce NYSE
Rule 472, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2472 (1999) (regulating members' communica-
tion with the public, including communications regarding individual companies'
market conditions and industries).
84 See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (asserting
that the SEC lacked the power to enact a rule preventing national securities ex-
changes and associations from listing stock of corporations that reduce sharehold-
ers' voting rights).
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cess to these two types of market information on a real-time basis
is essential in order for a stock exchange to provide liquidity.85 The
key event that led to broad participation in the U.S. equity markets
was the installation of battery-powered NYSE stock tickers in bro-
kerage-firm offices, beginning in 1867.86 Some stock exchanges
also publish information about the companies whose securities are
listed on the exchange.
8 7
5. THE OPERATION OF THE TRADING MARKETS
Although stock exchanges perform several functions, their es-
sential work, and their reason for existence, is to provide trading
markets for securities. The changes that are taking place in the
stock exchanges of the United States and Europe need to be seen in
light of how these trading markets actually work. The market
maintained by a stock exchange can be categorized in three differ-
ent ways: first, it may be a call market or a continuous market;
second, the market may be quote-driven or order-driven; and,
third, it may operate by open outcry on a trading floor, or it may be
an electronic market, without a physical trading floor.
5.1. Call Markets Versus Continuous Markets
If trading on an exchange is light, liquidity may be difficult to
achieve: because of the sparseness of the market, a buyer may not
be able to find a willing seller at the time it wants to buy. A call
market maximizes liquidity by compressing all trading into a short
period of time. All of the trading in each listed security is done in a
few minutes each day, when each stock is "called" out, and brokers
85 It is significant that, in its development of a national market system, the
first two steps that the SEC took were to require the stock exchanges and the
NASD to establish a consolidated tape, which discloses the prices of completed
transactions throughout the system, and a composite quotation system, which
discloses the prices at which dealers throughout the system are willing to buy and
sell securities. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets, supra note 45, at 916-22. In
1996, the SEC adopted a rule requiring market-makers to display customers' limit
orders. See Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-37619A, 62
S.E.C. Docket 2083 (Sept. 6, 1996) (adopting Rule l1Acl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240,11Acl-
4).
86 See LEONARD SLOANE, THE ANATOMY OF THE FLOOR 26 (1980) ("By 1867 bat-
tery-powered New York Stock Exchange stock tickers were installed in brokerage
firm offices ....").
87 In 1998, the NYSE derived $111 million or 15% of its revenue, from market
data fees. NYSE, 1998 ANNUAL REFoRT 43 (1998).
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representing buyers and sellers match their orders. The NYSE
used the call method until the mid-19th century. According to a
financial historian, "[u]nil 1871 the call auction market was the
process by which stocks were bought and sold on the Exchange.
With just two calls a day for buying and selling stocks-at 10:30
A.M. and 1 P.M.-there were only two opportunities to trade in
any individual issue."88
When trading on the NYSE became too active to be confined to
the limitation of the call system, the exchange switched to a con-
tinuous trading system. Under continuous trading, all listed stocks
are traded throughout the day, with each security being assigned
to a particular location, or "post," on the trading floor. Under this
system, "[a]ll buying and selling interests are funneled to one
place, where buyers have an opportunity to find the cheapest sell-
ers, and sellers the most eager buyers." 9
Although most major exchanges today have continuous trad-
ing, the call method is still used in some inactive markets. For ex-
ample, Euronext, the international stock exchange which was
formed in September 2000 through a merger of the Paris, Brussels,
and Amsterdam stock exchanges, uses the call method for its less
actively traded securities. Each trading day, there are two auctions
for equities and one auction for bonds.90
5.2. Quote-Driven Markets Versus Order-Driven Markets
In a quote-driven market, professional dealers known as mar-
ket-makers compete with each other by making bids and offers,
that is, publishing their willingness to buy and sell securities, as
well as the prices at which they are willing to buy and sell.91 In-
vestors (or the brokers who represent them) buy from and sell to
the market-makers at their published prices. Thus, every transac-
tion between two investors goes through a professional dealer,
&3 SLOANE, supra note 86, at 27-28.
89 Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets of the SEC, H.R. Doc- No. 83-
95, pt. 2, at 40 (1963) [hereinafter Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets].
90 Euronext Comprehensive Paper, supra note 30, at 11-12.
91 The U.S. Nasdaq market is by far the largest quote-driven market in the
world. Easdaq, which was formed in 1996, is a European quote-driven market for
small companies, was acquired by Nasdaq in 2001. See Vincent Boland, Nasdaq's
Lacklustre European Launch Leaves Executives Talking of Long Term, FIN. TIM.s (Lon-
don), July 16, 2001, at 24 [hereinafter Boland, Nasdaq's Lacklustre European Launch]
(discussing the lack of success of Nasdaq's expansion into Europe).
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who buys the security from the seller and sells it to the buyer and
is compensated for the risk he takes by the "spread," the difference
in price between his bid and his offer. For example, an investor
who wants to buy 100 shares of XYZ stock will give the order to a
broker, who will ascertain that the lowest offer for the stock is
20.50. The broker will buy the stock from the market-maker at
20.50 on behalf of his customer, charging the customer a commis-
sion.92 An investor who wishes to sell the same stock will ascertain
that the highest bid being made by any market-maker is 20.25. He
will sell the stock to the market-maker at that price, charging the
customer a commission. Thus, each customer pays the broker's
commission, plus the market-maker's spread.93 In return for pay-
ing the spread, the investor has an assurance that he will be able to
buy or sell shares at any time the market is open.94 Competition
among market-makers should enable the investor to get the best
execution (i.e., highest bid or lowest offer) available throughout the
market for the security at that time.95
In an order-driven market, brokers send their customers' buy
and sell orders to a central location, where they can be executed
with each other, without the intervention of a dealer. The NYSE
has an order-driven market. An investor may give his broker a
market order, which requires the broker to execute it promptly at
92 Instead of acting as agent and charging a commission, the broker may act
as principal, buying the stock from the market-maker and reselling it to his cus-
tomer. In that case, the broker would charge the customer a markup instead of a
commission.
9 More precisely, the bid-asked spread is twice the per share payment the
market-maker receives. Puneet Handa et al., The Ecology of an Order-Driven Mar-
ket: Too Complicated for Regulators to have All the Answers, 24 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT.
47,47 (1998).
9 Id.
95 Competition among market-makers does not always work as it should. In
1996, the SEC found that many Nasdaq market-makers were colluding to keep
bid-asked spreads artificially wide. This meant that investors were paying more
for securities they bought and receiving less for securities they sold than they
would have if competition had operated freely. See Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37538, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,825, at 88,362 (Aug. 8, 1996) ("Nasdaq market-makers have en-
gaged in conduct which has resulted in artificially inflexible spreads ... and un-
duly disadvantageous prices to investors... ."). The difficulty of getting market-
makers to compete rather than collude with each other was noted by the SEC as
early as 1963. Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, supra note 89, at 661-
62; see Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets, supra note 45, at 951-57 (noting that
competing specialists, who stand next to each other on the floor, possess a natural
tendency to collude rather than compete).
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the best available price. Alternatively, the investor may use a limit
order, which can be executed only at the limit price or a more fa-
vorable price. For example, an order to buy 100 shares of ABC
stock with a limit of 20 can be executed only at a price of 20 or
lower. If the limit order cannot be executed immediately (for ex-
ample, if the current market price of the stock is 20.50), the limit
order will be executed only if the market declines to 20. If another
investor gives his broker a market order to sell 100 shares of ABC,
this order may be executed against the limit order to buy at 20. In
that case, the two orders will be executed against each other, with-
out the interpositioning of a professional dealer. The two investors
will pay a commission to their brokers, but the price they pay or
receive will not include a market-maker's spread.
An order-driven market depends on the existence of limit or-
ders, since a market order to buy a security cannot be matched
with a market order to sell unless there is some mechanism to de-
termine the price at which the transaction is to be executed. 6 In an
order-driven market, limit orders establish transaction prices. An
investor who places a market order obtains an immediate execu-
tion but gets a less favorable execution than one who places a limit
order.97 Conversely, an investor who places a limit order will get a
more favorable price but runs the risk that his transaction will not
be executed.93
The NYSE is not a pure order-driven market, because the spe-
cialist firm, a member firm of the exchange that is given the exclu-
sive right to deal in the stocks that are "allocated" to it, is required
to step in and deal for its own account as a market-maker if there is
an absence of investors' orders.99 The specialist firm acts in a dual
capacity. It holds, displays, and executes limit orders that are en-
96 See Cox & Michael, supra note 65, at 843 ("[A] 'market' buy order and a
'market' sell order cannot be executed mechanically.").
97 See Mike McNamee, Taking Your Trade To the Limit, Bus. WK, Apr. 17, 2000,
at 204-05 (noting that with a market order, your order is usually filled, but with a
limit order, one can get a better deal on a stock).
93 For a more detailed explanation of how market orders and limit orders
contribute to the successful operation of an order-driven market, see Handa et al.,
supra note 93, at 48-49.
9 In 1998, "specialists acted as either the buyer or seller in 25.3% of the share
volume executed on the NYSE." Self Regulatory Organizations, Commission Re-
quest for Comment on Issues Relating to Market Fragmentation, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-42450, 71 S.E.C. Docket 1702 at 6 (Feb. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Self
Regulatory Organizations].
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trusted to it, and it acts as a market-maker, quoting its own bid and
asked prices and executing transactions as a principal for its own
account, but only to the extent necessary to maintain a fair and or-
derly market.100 Although the NYSE specialist has a monopoly be-
cause there is only one market-maker for each stock, investors'
limit orders provide competition for order flow and prevent exces-
sive bid-asked spreads1 °1 Similarly, Euronext, although an order-
driven market, uses specialists to supplement the liquidity-
providing function of investors' limit orders.
Similarly, Nasdaq is not a pure quote-driven market, because it
has the capacity to display the limit orders of customers, enabling
investors to trade directly with each other. Over-the-counter mar-
ket-makers are not required to accept limit orders from customers,
but if they do, they are required to display the orders publicly if
the orders are more favorable than the market-maker's own quota-
tion or if they add to the size of the market-maker's quotation.0 2
Thus, if a market-maker's quotation for XYZ stock is 20 bid, 21
asked, the market-maker must display any limit orders that it
holds to buy XYZ at 20 or above and any limit orders that it holds
to sell XYZ at 21 or below. The market-maker is required to exe-
cute its customers' limit orders before it can trade for its own ac-
count at an inferior price (i.e., seller at a higher price or buy at a
lower price).103
Most of the European stock exchanges, including Euronext and
Frankfurt, are order-driven markets.1 04 Order-driven markets tend
100 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78k(b) (1997);
Regulation of Specialists 11b-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-1 (2001); NYSE Rule 104,
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2104 (1999); see Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets, su-
pra note 45, at 891 ("[M]ost NYSE member firms doing business with the public
are also members of the Amex and one or more of the regional stock ex-
changes....").
101 Ackert & Church, supra note 60, at 5.
102 SEC Rule 11Acl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-4. See Order Execution Obliga-
tions, supra note 85.
103 In E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 25887 [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,303, at 89,327 (July 6,1988), the SEC
affirmed an NASD disciplinary action against a market-maker for selling stock for
its own account at a price above the limit price of a sell order that a customer had
entrusted to the firm, without executing the customer's order. The SEC stated
that when the firm accepted the customer's order it assumed a fiduciary obliga-
tion, which prohibited it from competing with the customer. Id. at 89,328-29.
104 Euronext Listing and Trading Rules, Art. N.4.1.5 (Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.euronextcom/en/euronext/inbrief/; see also Euronext History, su-
pra note 31, at 1 (stating that Euronext will provide "a unified order driven trad-
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to be less costly to investors than quote-driven markets, because
investors can trade directly with each other, without having to pay
the spread between bid and offer to a professional market-maker.
However, in a pure order-driven market (i.e., without any partici-
pation by a market-maker or specialist), investors have no assur-
ance that their buy and sell orders will be executed in a timely
fashion or at a favorable price' 05
In Europe, the only important quote-driven market is the Lon-
don Stock Exchange,106 whose SEAQ trading system,107 inaugu-
rated in 1986, was modeled on the Nasdaq system 1 3 In its strug-
gle to compete with other European stock markets, however, in
1997 the London Stock Exchange established an order-driven
trading system, called SETS, but only for its 200 largest stocks.'6
The fact that the quote-driven Nasdaq is basically incompatible
with the order-driven trading systems of the major European ex-
changes is likely to create difficulties for Nasdaq in its efforts to
establish a link with European trading systems. 10
ing platform.... "). The Frankfurt Exchange uses an electronic trading system
called Xetra, which automatically matches customers' orders. Deutsche Bdrse AG,
supra note 36.
105 See Norman S. Poser, Automation of Securities Markets and the European
Community's Proposed Investment Services Directive, 55-4 LAW & CONMMP. PROES 29,
43-45 (1992) (describing the characteristics of an order-driven market).
106 Easdaq, the European quote-driven market for small issues that was es-
tablished in 1996, has failed to gain much trading volume or liquidity during its
first five years of operation. In 2001, Nasdaq acquired a majority stake in Easdaq.
See Boland, Nasdaq's Lacklustre European Launch, supra note 91, at 24; see also Silvia
Ascarelli, Easdaq, Nasdaq Plan Faces Vote, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at C12 (de-
scribing the takeover); John Labate, Peter Thai Larsen, & Juliana Ratner, Nasdaq in
Talks to Take Over Easdaq, FIN. TImES (London), Jan. 30, 2001, at 27 (discussing the
takeover).
107 SEAQ is an acronym for Stock Exchange Automated Quotations. PosER,
BIG BANG, supra note 20, at 43.
103 See id. at 39-42.
709 Portanger & Fuhrmans, supra note 21, at Cl. In early 2000, fifty-three per-
cent of trades on the London exchange, by value, were executed automatically
through the SETS system, rather than being carried out on the telephone or
through market-makers. Boland, A Slare in the Future, supra note 22, at 19. Since
the stocks traded on SETS tend to be priced higher than other stocks, it is likely
that the percentage of LSE transactions executed on SETS is smaller.
110 A study released by the SEC in January 2001 showed that spreads (i.e., the
difference between what a buyer pays and a seller receives for a stock) were wider
for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE stocks on all but the very largest stocks. This
indicates that the transaction costs on the NYSE's order-driven market tend to be
less than the transaction costs on the Nasdaq's quote-driven market. Nasdaq
costs tend to be about the same as NYSE's on those stocks in which ECNs have
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5.3. Open-Outcry Markets Versus Electronic Markets
All of the major European stock exchanges (and many of the
minor ones) have eliminated their trading floors in favor of elec-
tronic trading. The LSE, as part of its 1986 program of deregula-
tion and restructuring known as "Big Bang," was the first Euro-
pean exchange to make the conversion."' Within a few years, the
other European exchanges, notably Paris, Frankfurt, Milan, and
Amsterdam, had converted to electronic trading. By contrast, the
principal U.S. exchanges, the NYSE and the American Stock Ex-
change (which was acquired by the NASD in 1998),112 have re-
tained their trading floors and open-outcry systems, which go back
to the mid-nineteenth century, before the telephone, let alone the
computer, had been invented. Bids and offers are shouted out by
hundreds of exchange members on the NYSE's 36,000-square-foot
trading floor." 3
Electronic trading systems have several advantages over tradi-
tional exchanges. They have the convenience of providing access
from anywhere where there is a computer terminal; they offer in-
vestors real-time display of bids, offers, actual prices of transac-
tions, and trading volume; they can be linked with other informa-
tional systems; they are cheaper to build and operate; they make
clearing and settlement easier and more reliable; and they protect
investors by their capacity to reconstruct transactions. 114 An indi-
cation of their advantages is that, when the LSE switched to an
electronic trading system, it cautiously decided to retain its trading
floor as an alternative method of trading; within a few weeks, the
volume of trading on the floor dried up, and floor trading was
made the biggest inroads into the business of the traditional U.S. securities mar-
kets. Greg Ip & Michael Schroeder, SEC Price Study Deals Blow to Nasdaq, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 9, 2001, at C1.
111 "Big Bang" was a comprehensive reform of the Lond6n Stock Exchange's
structure and procedures. Besides changing the trading system, it also involved
opening access to exchange membership to all qualified firms, including interna-
tional commercial and investment banks; permitting member firms to act as both
brokers and dealers; and abolishing fixed rates of commission. See POSER, BIG
BANG, supra note 20, at 27-57.
112 POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 82, § 13.02.
113 The NYSE Web site describes the trading floor as a "world unto itself,
made up of its people, its unique lingo and its world-renowned technology."
NYSE, The Floor Community, at http://www.nyse.com/floor/floorcommunity
.html.
114 Solomon & Corso, supra note 9, at 318-19.
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terminated. 15 The LSE's traditional trading system simply could
not compete with the computers.16
The trading systems of several of the European exchanges-as
well as Asian exchanges, such as that in Singapore"?- are based on
an electronic centralized limit order book ("CLOB"). Orders to buy
and sell securities are entered into a central computer, limit orders
are displayed, and market orders are automatically executed
against the limit orders displayed on the CLOB. The CLOB oper-
ates under a system of price and time priority. Priority is given to
limit orders with the most favorable price (lowest bid or highest of-
fer). If two limit orders are entered at the same price, the first or-
der entered has priority. Brokers and investors participating in the
system are thus able to get the best available execution of their or-
ders. All orders for a particular security, no matter where they
originated, are entered into the system and matched automatically.
Limit orders are protected, in the sense that they are required to be
executed before any order at an inferior price or entered at a later
time may be executed.
CLOB is neither new nor revolutionary. In the 1970s, the SEC
proposed that the U.S. markets adopt the CLOB as a central ingre-
dient of the national market system that Congress had man-
dated."8 The proposal was quietly shelved, in the face of fierce
opposition from many NYSE members, who believed (with some
justification) that the CLOB would sound the death knell of the
trading floor. Brokers would be impelled to enter the orders into
the system rather than send them to the NYSE trading floor, in or-
der to make sure their customers received the best available execu-
tion of their buy and sell orders."19 Thus, the NYSE claimed at the
time, the time priority afforded public orders entered in CLOB
"would eventually lead to the elimination of exchange trading
floors by inexorably forcing all trading into a fully automated
"15 POSER, BIG BANG, supra note 20, at 45.
116 See Gerald T. Nowak, Note, A Failure of Communication: An Argument for
the Closing of the NYSE Floor, 26 U. Mic- J.L RE~oIu 485 (1993) (arguing that a
move by the NYSE to electronic trading is necessary if the United States is to re-
tain its preeminence as a financial center).
117 Philip Coggan, Survey of Singapore: Nomine Coines to the Aid of the Clob,
FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 8,1996, at V.
118 Development of a National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
14,416,14 S.E.C. Docket 31,40-41 & 41 n.54 ([an. 26,1978).
119 Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets, supra note 45, at 928-29.
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trading system."120 In February 2000, more than twenty years after
it had originally proposed the CLOB, the SEC requested comment
on the proposal as a way of avoiding the fragmentation of the
markets for individual securities. Market fragmentation was
threatened by the appearance during the 1990s of several proprie-
tary trading systems, the ECNs.121 The ECNs compete with the
established exchanges for order flow in listed as well as over-the-
counter securities. 22 They offer the public less expensive execution
of their orders than that afforded by a traditional trading floor.123
A year after it resurrected the CLOB proposal, the Commission had
taken no further action on it.
The main attractions of electronic trading are that it is faster,
less expensive, and less prone to error than open outcry on a trad-
ing floor. The technology to create a fully automated trading sys-
tem is available and is, in fact, being used at exchanges throughout
the world. 24 Clearly, there are "cheaper ways of trading shares
than using armies of brokers and spending the day on the tele-
phone, and technology is fast undermining the structure of tradi-
tional U.S. markets."125 Electronic trading is also capable of exe-
cuting more complex orders than manual trading methods.
Electronic trading permits so-called "Boolean" 26 trades. For ex-
120 Development of a National Market System, supra note 118, at 29.
121 Self Regulatory Organizations, supra note 99, at *21-22. Fragmentation of the
U.S. markets was more of a threat than a reality. In September 1999, 74.4% of the
trades and 83.9% of the share volume in NYSE-listed securities were executed on
the NYSE. Id. at *6. The percentage of share volume in all listed securities that
was executed on the NYSE actually rose from 81.9% in 1990 to 85.1% in 1999. 2000
SEC ANN. REP. 154.
122 ECNs have made substantial inroads in the over-the-counter market, ac-
counting for an estimated 30% of the trading in Nasdaq securities in 1999; but
they accounted for only a negligible percentage (an estimated 4%) of the trading
in exchange-listed securities. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 82, § 17.03.
123 It has been pointed out that, before automation of the exchange market
began, a total of seventeen human contacts were necessary to execute one trade on
the floor of the NYSE. The NYSE's automated order-routing system, called Des-
ignated Order Turnaround ("DOT"), which is used for smaller orders, eliminates
eight of the seventeen contacts. While DOT reduces some costs and opportunities
for error, it is slower than electronic trading, and it still relies on floor brokers and
specialists to execute transactions. Nowak, supra note 116, at 488-96.
124 See id. at 486-87 (highlighting that the development of technology and
supercomputers has allowed for an automated trading system).
125 Boland, Bourses Jostle, supra note 56, at I.
126 The word "Boolean" is defined as: "Of or relating to a logical combinato-
rial system treating variables, such as propositions and computer logic elements,
through the operators AND, OR, NOT, IF, THEN, and EXCEPT ... ." The word is
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ample, an investor may instruct her broker to sell Microsoft at 50 if
she can buy IBM at 95 and buy Intel at 30. Only a computer can
match such orders, using algorithms that would be impossible, or
much too time-consuming, for a floor trader to execute effi-
cienflyiv
The vision of a world stock market, where securities of inter-
national interest are traded in a single system, and where investors
would receive the best execution of their buy and sell orders, is in-
compatible with the NYSE's open outcry method of trading. Yet,
despite the advantages of electronic trading, the NYSE has resisted
proposals that it give up its trading floor.128 On the contrary, plans
are underway to build a new trading floor in New York across
Broad Street from the NYSE's present location, which will be sub-
sidized by New York taxpayers to the extent of over $600 million.
This project has met with strenuous opposition, and whether it will
be implemented remains to be seen 29
One possible explanation for the NYSE's reluctance to move to
electronic trading is concern about the unreliability of computers.
All of the large European electronic stock exchanges have experi-
enced technical failures, which have caused trading delaysj3D A
second explanation is that transaction costs for doing trades on the
NYSE are already competitively low, chiefly because the U.S. mar-
kets have a sophisticated and integrated system in place for clear-
ing and settling transactions. 3 ' If it were not for the efficiency of
derived from George Boole, a British mathematician and logician who developed
a calculus of symbolic logic. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIoARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 217 (3d ed. 1992).
127 See Hal R. Varian, Boolean Trades and Hurricane Bonds, WALL ST. J., May 8,
2000, at A42 (discussing the future of electronic exchanges).
128 As discussed below, the NYSE is deeply divided on the question. See infra
text accompanying notes 136-39.
129 Charles V. Bagli, Doubts Rise on New Site for Big Board, N.Y. TIMfs, June 6,
2000, at B3; Greg Ip & Peter Grant, NYSE's Deal for Staying in New York Draws Fire,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2000, at C22; Linda Sandier & Greg Ip, Taking Stock of Big
Board's Pricey 'Big Box,' WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2000, at B12. The attack on the World
Trade Center on September 11, 2001, exposed the vulnerability of the exchange's
trading floor to terrorism. After the attack, the NYSE stated that it may postpone
its building plans. See Alex Berenson, A Nation Challenged: The Exchange; Feel-
ing Vulnerable at Heart of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,2001, at C1.
130 The Paris, Amsterdam, Brussels, Madrid, Milan, and Lisbon exchanges
had to suspend trading several times during 2000 because of technical problems.
Alex Skorecki, Technical Problems Dog Stock Exchanges, FIN. TIi.S (London), July 7,
2000, at 21.
131 See Boland, Bourses Jostle, supra note 56, atl.
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this system, which was developed in the 1970s as a result of the
"back office" crisis of that era, it would have been impossible for
Wall Street to process combined NYSE and Nasdaq daily trading
volume, which in the year 2000 sometimes exceeded three billion
shares.
But these are at best only partial explanations. To understand
why the NYSE clings to the open-outcry trading method, it is nec-
essary to examine the internal structure of the exchange and the
different constituencies that it serves.
6. THE CONSTITUENCIES OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE
The traditional stock exchange is not a monolith. It is com-
posed of several constituencies, each with different interests and
concerns. The forces that are buffeting the world's stock ex-
changes, particularly the move from open-outcry systems on trad-
ing floors to electronic trading systems, have different impacts on
the different constituencies. Paradoxically, the largest stock ex-
change, the NYSE, is the most resistant to change, because its pow-
erful floor-member constituency has the most to lose from the in-
troduction of an electronic trading system.132
The membership of the NYSE is limited to 1,366 seat holders.133
Because the number is limited, a membership is a valuable fran-
chise. In 2000, a seat on the exchange was sold for as much as $2
million.134 Thus, more than two-and-a-half billion dollars is at
stake, just in seat values, in any major change in the structure of
the NYSE.
It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that all exchange
members have the same interests, or that the key issues confront-
132 Portanger & Fuhrmans, supra note 21, at C15. Although the floor mem-
bers of the LSE did not block that exchange's transition to electronic trading in
1986, the exchange's market-makers subsequently did impede the exchange's
transition from a quote-driven market to an order-driven market. Id.
133 This number has remained the same since 1953. In addition, there are
fifty-eight individuals who, through payment of an annual fee, are entitled to
physical or electronic access to the exchange's trading floor. These latter mem-
bers, however, do not have distributive rights to the exchange's net assets. NYSE
FACT BOOK 2000 DATA (2001), at 83.
134 In 1990, an NYSE seat sold for as little as $250,000, and in 1999 the highest
price paid for a seat was $2,650,000. Id. at 110. In part, the increase in seat prices
reflects the increase in trading volume during the same period. The average daily
volume of trading on the NYSE rose from 157 million shares in 1990 to 1.4 billion
shares in 2000. Id. at 100.
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ing the stock exchanges today necessarily pit members against
non-members. It is more accurate to think of the NYSE in terms of
its various constituencies, and to divide these constituencies be-
tween the providers of the exchange's services, on the one hand,
and the users of these services, on the other. The service providers
are, first, the members (i.e., specialists and floor brokers) who
spend their working days on the floor of the exchange; and, sec-
ond, the exchange's paid administrators, the bureaucrats and
regulators who make the exchange run. The users are, first, its
member firms, including large investment banking and brokerage
firms, that deal directly with the public; second, the institutional
and individual investors who are customers of these firms; and,
third, the exchange's listed companies which are the investment
banking clients of these firms.1' Thus, different categories of
members are providers and users of the exchange's services.
An electronic system, particularly if it takes the form of a CLOB
with time and price priority, would make the function of the floor
members superfluous, because all customers' buy and sell orders
would very likely be swept into the electronic system. Being an
NYSE specialist is an extremely lucrative business, so it is hardly
surprising that the specialists have vigorously opposed the intro-
duction of a CLOBY-6 To protect their customers' orders ade-
quately and to assure that they received time priority, brokers
would be impelled to enter their customers orders into the system,
thus bypassing the specialists and floor brokers on the exchange
floor.
135 Greg Ip & Randall Smith, Tense Excdtange: Big Board's Members Face Off on
the Issue of Automated Trading, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15,1999, at Al.
In the past year, the heads of the major firms have begun wondering if
the floor traders are an anachronistic barrier to change in an increasingly
electronic world. Wondering, in other words, if the people who most
symbolize America's free markets are themselves resisting freemarket
forces simply to protect their own livelihoods. To some floor traders,
though, it is the big firms that are giving short shrift to a principle: that of
loyalty.
Id.
13' "Most private specialist firms... have returns on equity that can exceed
35%, compared with around 25% for brokerage firms ... ." Charles Gasparino,
Bear Stearns to Acquire Specialist, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2001, at C1. According to the
Wall Street Journal, the profits of Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, one of the largest spe-
cialists firms, averaged $16 milion per partner in just nine months during the year
2000. Greg Ip, If Big Board Specialists Are an Anadronism, T77te're a Profitable One,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at Al.
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On the other hand, many of the member firms of the exchange
that do business with the public and direct the flow of customers'
orders see electronic trading not as a threat but rather as an op-
portunity to reduce costs (and perhaps to pass some of the savings
on to their customers).137 In early 2000, three of the largest of these
member firms, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, and
Merrill Lynch, filed a confidential "white paper" with the SEC
proposing that the Commission approve the establishment of a na-
tional electronic system, including a CLOB, for trading U.S.
stocks.138 The proposal contained an implicit threat that the firms
would establish a national electronic trading system for NYSE
stocks if the exchange does not do so. These three firms and other
large international banks already control some of the new elec-
tronic systems that are challenging the old-line stock exchanges. 139
It is likely that the NYSE will resolve its membership conflict
by demutualizing, i.e., by turning itself into a shareholder-owned,
for-profit company and then selling its shares to the public.140 A
public offering of stock exchange shares would enable the NYSE's
floor members to liquidate their financial stake in the exchange and
thus free the exchange to modernize its trading operation, in order
137 A plan developed by the NYSE in 1999 to set up an electronic communi-
cations network of its own to automatically match orders of up to 1,000 shares
would cost the specialists an estimated $100 million in commissions. These com-
missions represent potential savings to the exchange's member firms. The ex-
change's plan was expected to face strong resistance from its specialists. Heike
Wipperfurth, Beset by Rivals, the NYSE Considers Two Broad Electronic Trading Coun-
terattacks, INv. DEALERS' DIGEST, Nov. 8, 1999, at 3. Similarly, the LSE's plan to
switch from a quote-driven to an order-driven market was delayed by opposition
from the exchange's market-makers. See Portanger & Fuhrmans, supra note 21, at
C1 (discussing the LSE's reluctance to adopt new technology for trading).
13 Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, Sweeping Change in Market Structure
Sought, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at Cl. The firms modified their proposal, after
several market participants criticized it on the grounds that a single system for
trading stocks would stifle competition and innovation. See Michael Schroeder,
Powerhouses Change Tune on Overhaul, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2000, at C1 (explaining
the change in overhaul plans as an attempt to speed up the pace of change).
139 For example, Tradepoint is an electronic system, registered as a stock ex-
change in Britain, which is controlled by a consortium of 11 investors, including
J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. Tradepoint, supra note 48.
140 Professor Karmel believes that demutualization may actually be a "cover
for shifting the power structure of the NYSE and Nasdaq further away from the
specialists and market-makers to the large securities firms." Roberta S. Karmel,
Turning Seats Into Shares: Implications of Demutualization for the Regulation of
Stock and Futures Exchanges 64 (Dec. 22, 2000) (unpublished paper, on file with
author).
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to compete successfully for order flow both with electronic com-
munications networks in the United States and electronic stock ex-
changes in Europe.141
Another development that is likely to reduce the conflict
among exchange members is the acquisition of specialist firms by
large investment and commercial banks. in 2000 and 2001, Fleet-
Boston Financial, a banking and brokerage conglomerate, which
already owned a specialist firm, acquired M.J. Meehan & Co. for an
estimated $200 million, to form the NYSE's largest specialist firm,
measured by the number of listings; Goldman Sachs acquired
Spear, Leads & Kellogg, one of the largest specialist firms, for $6.5
billion and Benjamin Jacobson & Sons, another large firm, for $250
million; and Bear Stearns acquired Wagner Stott, the fifth largest
specialist firm, for $625 million. To the extent that the exchange's
specialists are controlled by the users of the services that the ex-
change provides, the floor-generated resistance to electronic trad-
ing may weaken.142
A publicly owned NYSE (or NASD) would have to be respon-
sive to its shareholders and more willing to meet the competition
from Europe and from electronic trading systems in this country.
To a stock exchange, public ownership has the additional advan-
tage of providing it with the cash it needs to invest in the technol-
ogy that would enable it to compete effectively with its more effi-
dent competitors in the United States and Europe. Furthermore, a
publicly owned stock exchange can use the cash generated by a
public offering, or its publicly-held stock, as currency to make ac-
quisitions.143 For this reason, a membership organization such as
the NASD, even though it does not have the NYSE's conflict be-
141 Nevertheless, many independent traders are skeptical about demutuali-
zation for the reason that it would speed the push toward electronic trading and
jeopardize their jobs. Peter A. McKay, For-Profit Plans by Exctanges Hit a Big Virall:
Member Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3,2000, at C1.
142 See Gasparino, supra note 136, at Cl (discussing Goldman's agreement to
acquire Benjamin Jacobson & Sons); Greg Ip & John Hechinger, FleetBoston is Set to
Buy MJ. Meehan & Co., Creating Largest Specialist Firm on NYSE Floor, WALL ST. J.,
July 25, 2000, at CIS (discussing FleetBoston's acquisition of M.J. Meehan & Co.);
Jeff D. Opdyke, Goldman Boosts Clout In Trading, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2001, at CI
(discussing Bear Stearns' plans to buy Wagner Scott Mercator).
143 One of the purposes of the initial public offering made in February 2001
by Deutsche B6rse, the owner of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, was to "give it an
acquisition currency it will almost certainly use to buy other operators, putting
itself at the centre of a European hub." Wassener & Boland, supra note 39, at 29.
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tween floor members and "upstairs" members, will have difficulty
taking over a major European exchange unless it demutualizes1 44
Demutualization, however, has potential drawbacks. The re-
cent attempt by the Swedish OM Group to take over the London
exchange, although unsuccessful, shows that a publicly owned
stock exchange can be prey as well as predator. The London ex-
change managed to remain independent, largely because its char-
ter did not allow any single shareholder to own more than 4.9% of
its shares. Equally important, regulators see a conflict between the
duty of the managers of a publicly owned stock exchange to
maximize profits for the benefit of its shareholders and their regu-
latory obligation to protect investors, even if regulation means re-
ducing profits. For this reason, it is possible that the government
will reduce its reliance on self-regulation by the exchanges to pro-
tect investors, and will take an increasingly assertive role in regu-
lating the securities industry.145
7. REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL MARKETS
This brings us to the question of the role of government: first,
in the development of the markets of the future, and, second, in the
regulation of these markets. Government regulators, both in the
United States and abroad, have expressed uncertainty as to what
their role should be in shaping the structure of the markets. In
1975, Congress directed the SEC to "use its authority... to facili-
tate the establishment of a national market system for securi-
ties ... ."146 It has always been unclear what this mandate means,
and the Commission's degree of assertiveness in restructuring the
markets has varied from time to time. Under the leadership of
Chairman Harold Williams in the 1970s, the SEC attempted to
shape the markets of the future by requiring the various market
centers to create unified facilities for communication of quotations
and transaction prices, market linkage, order routing, and protec-
144 See Jim McTague, A Stockholder-Owned Big Board: Too Famous to Fail?
Banking Reform and Life Insurers, BARRON'S, Nov. 1, 1999, at 34 ("Congress and the
regulators think its brand name is so closely identified with American capitalism
that the government would never allow it to fail.").
145 Before the LSE demutuaized, the U.K. government relieved it of most of
its regulatory duties. Boland, A Share in the Future, supra note 22, at 19.
146 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1994).
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tion of limit orders. 47 Not all of these initiatives came to fruition,
and in later years the SEC has taken a less active approach to its
role as a facilitator of the development of a national market system.
Most recently, the Commission stated:
[Tihe Commission has not attempted to dictate the ultimate
structure of the securities markets. Instead, it has sought to
establish, monitor, and strengthen a framework that gives
the forces of competition sufficient room to flourish and
that allows the markets to develop according to their own
genius. The Commission remains committed to allowing
the forces of competition to shape market structure in the
first instance. 148
In conformance with this policy, the SEC has not required ECNs to
register as national securities exchanges, a requirement that would
have inhibited the growth of ECNs because of the costs involved.
149 Nevertheless, the SEC, on occasion, has not hesitated to use its
authority to require the exchanges and the NASD to make struc-
tural changes that the agency deems necessary.'5 0
147 For a critique of the role of the SEC in implementing the national market
system, see Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets, supra note 45, at 946-51. On im-
portant questions relating to market structure, the SEC's approach in recent years
has been more cautious than it was in the 1970s, consisting of issuing "concept
releases," requesting public comment on general issues, and inviting the market
centers to develop plans, rather than itself adopting rules. See, e.g., Self Regulatory
Organizations, supra note 99, at *21-22 (discussing the solicitation of responses con-
cerning the NYSE's proposed rule change and the Commission's request for
comment on market fragmentation).
148 Self Regulatory Organizations, supra note 99, at*15.
149 Under rules adopted by the SEC in 1998, an ECN may choose to register
either as a broker-dealer or as a national securities exchange. An ECN that regis-
ters as a broker-dealer is required to comply with a new Regulation ATS, which
imposes certain reporting and record-keeping requirements. An ECN that regis-
ters as a stock exchange becomes a self-regulatory organization and is subject to a
panoply of regulatory requirements. See Regulation of Exchanges, supra note 43,
at *25 (explaining regulation of exchanges and of ATS); see also Board of Trade of
the City of Chicago v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270 (7th Cir. 1991) (deferring to determina-
tion by SEC that a proprietary system for the electronic execution, clearing, and
guarantee of transactions in put and call options on government bonds is not an
exchange).
150 For example, the SEC has required the US. securities markets to replace
the traditional method of pricing securities in fractions with a decimal system. See
Decimalization Implementation Plan Order, SEC Release No. 34-42360, 2000 WIL
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The European Commission ("EC"), lacking the direct power
enjoyed by the SEC, has not played a significant role in the devel-
opment of cross-border linkages of securities markets. The EC re-
cently set up a working group to advise it on how best to integrate
the markets of Europe and how to avoid the delays of its cumber-
some current rulemaking procedures. 51 It is questionable, how-
ever, whether the EC's deliberations will progress fast enough to
have an effect on the fast-moving changes in the structure of the
markets. It is more likely that the shape of the markets of the fu-
ture will be determined by the business decisions of market par-
ticipants, rather than by government regulators.
Even if it were possible to create an "international SEC," it is
not at all dear that it would be desirable for such an agency to have
plenary power over market structure. Government agencies are
not well suited to make the kind of business decisions that would
be involved in establishing an international securities market. In
general, their role should be confined to protecting investors and
the market against fraud and anti-competitive practices. 5 2 The fact
that the implementation of the proposed Archipelago-Pacific Ex-
change merger, referred to earlier,153 has been delayed by the SEC
for nearly a year, for political or bureaucratic reasons that may
have little or nothing to do with its merits, highlights the defects of
regulatory control over market developments.154
Turning to the question of how cross-border securities markets
are to be regulated, the fundamental question is the extent to
which regulation will be left to the exchanges themselves and to
what extent it will be performed by the government. The United
States has a long tradition of self-regulation. Although the coun-
tries of Europe (with the exception of the United Kingdom) do not
have this tradition, it is likely that self-regulation will be an im-
91915 Gan. 28, 2000) (ordering the submission of a decimalization implementation
plan from the exchanges and the NASD).
151 Bengt Ljung, EU 'Wise Men' Group Cool to Creating SEC-Style Agency to
Streamline System, 32 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1588-89 Uuly 3,2000).
152 I set forth this view in more detail in 1981, and the developments of the
past twenty years have not changed my mind. See Poser, Restructuring the Stock
Markets, supra note 45, at 946-51 (explaining the role of federal regulatory agencies,
with a focus on the SEC).
153 See supra text accompanying note 43.
154 See PCX Concerned About SEC Moratorium, supra note 46 (discussing PCX's
concern that the actions of the SEC, particularly its delay on rulemaking, could
delay its plans to create the first open, electronic U.S. stock market).
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portant element of any regulatory scheme covering cross-border
markets.
In the United States, the stock exchanges have been required to
be self-regulators since the enactment of the Exchange Act in
1934j55 Self-regulation, however, has not been an altogether
happy story. From the Whitney scandal of the 1930s, when the
president of the NYSE was found guilty of embezzling a fund es-
tablished for the widows and orphans of deceased members, to the
NASD scandal of the 1990s, when market-makers colluded on a
grand scale to fix bid-and-asked quotes, the self-regulatory organi-
zations have often been too willing to look away, even when di-
rectly confronted by continued and egregious misconduct by their
members. 56
Furthermore, when regulatory power is given to members of
an industry, it is likely to be abused, to the detriment of the public.
The economist Adam Smith, writing in 1776, put it wel: "People
of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices."157 Self-regulation
thus produces a tension between the conflicting goals of the anti-
trust laws, to preserve competition, and the securities laws, to
protect investors. The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve
this tension by giving the exchanges and the NASD a narrow ex-
emption from antitrust liability, but only when they are actually
performing their self-regulatory functions and only when the SEC
is actively supervising their activities.sS
The exchanges and the NASD, being at the same time operators
of a market and self-regulators, have a built-in conflict of interest
The combination of these two functions may be a factor causing the
155 The 1934 Act, as originally enacted, required every stock exchange to reg-
ister with the Commission, to file its rules with the Commission, to agree to com-
ply with the Act and its rules, and to enforce compliance by its members, "so far
as is within its powers." Philip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214,221 (1959).
156 See Nat'1 Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, supra note 95, at 88,361 (discussing mis-
conduct in Nasdaq); ROBERT SOBEL, NYSE 46-50 (1975) (outlining the Whitney
scandal), Dale A. Oesterle, Comments on the SEC's Market 2000 Report: On, Among
Other Things, Deference to SROs, the Mirage of Price Improvement, the Arrogation of
Property Rights in Order Flow, and SEC Incrementalism, 19 J. CORP. L. 483,488 (1993)
(discussing the Whitney scandal and subsequent scandals concerning the SEC).
157 ADAM SITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, quoted in THE OxFORD DICIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 509 (3d ed. 1979).
15M Gordon v. NYSE, 422 US. 659 (1975); Silver v. NYSE, 373 US. 341 (1963).
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regulatory arm of the SRO, either consciously or subconsciously, to
be less diligent than it should be in conducting its surveillance du-
ties and in responding to warning signals of possible misconduct.
In responding to the breakdown of self-regulation at the NASD in
the 1990s, the SEC required the NASD to separate its regulatory
function from its operation of the Nasdaq market by establishing a
separate subsidiary for each of the two functions.159 Curiously, the
SEC has never required the NYSE to separate its regulatory func-
tions from its operational functions, despite periodic and systemic
collapses of its self-regulatory process.160
It is not clear what impact stock exchange demutualization,
which is already realized in Europe and all but inevitable in the
United States, will have on the ability of stock exchanges to regu-
late themselves and the brokers and dealers who use their facilities.
On the one hand, the regulatory staff of a stock exchange that is a
publicly owned corporation will be one step further removed from
159 The separation involves only the NASD staff. The Nasdaq Stock Market,
Inc. and NASD Regulation, Inc. subsidiaries of NASD, Inc. have boards of direc-
tors that overlap with each other as well as with that of the parent company. See
POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAw, supra note 82, at 13-16 (describing the overlap). In
2001, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. moved one step further away from NASD, Inc.,
its parent company, by completing a private placement of its stock. Following the
private placement, the NASD owns forty percent of Nasdaq, while investors own
sixty percent Nasdaq Completes Private Offering, Moving Toward Independence From
NASD, 33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 123 UJan. 29,2001).
160 Aside from the Whitney scandal, referred to above, the NYSE self-
regulatory system was unable or unwilling to deal effectively with the "back of-
fice" crisis of 1969-71 and the floor trading scandal of the late 1990s. See Special
Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Review of SEC Records of the Demise of Selected
Broker-Dealers, 3, 18 (Subcomm. Print 1971) (proposing a need to improve eligi-
bility requirements for becoming a broker-dealer); New York Stock Exchange, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-41574, 1999 WL 430863, at *1 (June 29, 1999) (deliber-
ating over the NYSE's failure to enforce compliance with § 11(a) of the Exchange
Act, a section aimed at preventing independent floor brokers from taking advan-
tage of their position on the floor); see also United States v. Oakford Corp., 1999
WL 1201725, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1999) (describing as "anorexic" the NYSE's
enforcement of the statutory prohibition against a floor broker's trading for an ac-
count in which he held an interest).
In a separate case, the SEC found, in 1962, that self-regulation had almost to-
tally collapsed at the American Stock Exchange ("ASE"), then the second-largest
U.S. exchange, with the result that "manifold and prolonged abuses by specialists
and floor traders" had occurred. SEC, STAFF REIORT ON ORGANIZATION,
MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK
EXCHANGE 53-54 (1962). The ASE is now owned and operated by the NASD but
run as a separate exchange.
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the brokers and dealers who operate on the exchange than is the
case today. Thus, it is likely that there will be less pressure on the
staff to favor market participants over the public when their re-
spective interests conflict. Under demutualization, the principal
(or exclusive) loyalty of the staff of a publicly owned stock ex-
change will be to senior management and ultimately to the board
of directors, whose interests may be more closely aligned with the
investing public than would be the managers of a membership-
owned exchange. On the other hand, a publicly owned stock ex-
change, whose stock is traded in the public securities market, may
be under considerable pressure to maximize profits, even at the
risk of reducing investor protections. 6' On balance, the regulatory
advantages of demutualization probably outweigh the drawbacks.
Despite its shortcomings and its non-reassuring history, self-
regulation is likely to play an important role in the cross-border
electronic stock exchanges of the future. There are two main rea-
sons for this. First, although the lack of a supranational securities
commission with the power to promulgate and enforce interna-
tional standards for the increasingly international markets has been
termed "a dangerous absurdity,"' 62 such a commission does not
seem likely in the foreseeable future. 63 Even within the European
161 For example, the quest for profits may induce an exchange to seek listings
of companies with little or no history of operations. Listing fees typically com-
prise a substantial portion of stock exchange revenues. In 1998, listing fees were
the NYSE's largest single source of revenue, accounting for forty-one percent of its
total revenues. NYSE, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at 43. In early 2001,
the U.S. Government Accounting Office began an inquiry into whether the ASE,
in its efforts to obtain new listings, was properly applying its own criteria for
listing. GAO to Study Amex Listing Practices; Compare With Those of Otler Markets,
33 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 241 (Feb. 19,2001).
Doubts as to whether a market that is under pressure for profits would be
able to regulate itself have led to proposals that self-regulation be concentrated in
a single industry-wide "superregulator," which would not be connected with any
particular market. The superregulator proposal has been supported by the NASD
but opposed by the NYSE, which is anxious to keep its "brand name" image. Sze
Rethinking Wall Street, supra note 42, at 146 (discussing how the NYSE and Nasdaq
intend to change to shareholder-owned, public companies).
162 Gilles Thieffry, Towards a European Securities Commission, INw'L FIN. L REV.
(Oct 1999), at 14.
163 There have been many calls for a single regulatory agency to govern in-
ternational markets, with power to enforce its decisions, but there has been little
actual progress toward this goal. Aside from the reluctance of national govern-
ments to cede any part of their sovereignty, there is the difficulty that different
countries have different institutional arrangements for the regulation of their se-
curities markets. Solomon & Corso, supra note 9, at 329, 337; sce Cox & Michael,
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Union ("EU"), the enforcement of transnational standards has not
been particularly effective. The current procedure requires the
European Commission to adopt directives, which each member
country implements by enacting national legislation. 64 This is by
its nature a time-consuming and uncertain process. Changes in
technology and in the securities business, on the other hand, are
occurring with enormous speed. Of course, regulation by the EU,
even if it were effective, would not govern participation in cross-
border trading by residents of the United States and other non-
European countries. Regulation can obstruct the use of technology
that will reduce investors' costs, instead of protecting investors.
That leaves a lot of scope for self-regulation. We already see
increased reliance on self-regulation of cross-border markets. Eu-
ronext provides an example. Although the securities firms partici-
pating in the system continue to be licensed and regulated by the
regulatory agencies of their home countries, Euronext will have a
central market surveillance department.165 Furthermore, Euronext
is developing a common set of rules to govern listing qualifications
and disclosure requirements applicable to listed companies.166
These are not rules promulgated by a government agency, but by
contractual arrangements among the participants. This suggests
that self-regulation has the ability to finesse the problems of na-
tional sovereignty and differing legal systems that stand in the vay
of developing and enforcing common governmental regulatory
standards.
The second reason why self-regulation will continue to be im-
portant is that it is in the self-interest of the persons operating and
participating in the securities markets to attract investors, and that
can be done only if the markets are perceived to be open and fair.
Any trading system, whether it is organized as a proprietary sys-
tem or as a membership organization, must have rules governing
supra note 65, at 859-61 (discussing the role of regulation of international securities
markets).
164 See POSER, BIG BANG, supra note 20, at 346-53 (summarizing the European
Union's directives dealing with investment services).
165 See Euronext Comprehensive Paper, supra note 30, at 8 (depicting Euronext as
a pan-European, integrated market in all of its aspects, including organization,
regulation, and technology).
166 See id. at 8, 10 (emphasizing that Euronext will require that the listing cri-
teria for the three markets be harmonized); see also Vincent Boland, Merger Re-
shapes the Financial Landscape, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2000, at 2 (describing
Euronext's vision of a single rulebook).
[Vol. 22:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss3/2
2001] STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE U.S. AND EUROPE 539
the conduct of its members and the means of enforcing these rules.
For example, the rules of Tradepoint, the U.K. trading system, re-
quire that participating firms agree to comply with its rules, super-
vise their personnel, and provide Tradepoint with access to infor-
mation and records necessary to carry out its regulatory
functions.167
8. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the stock exchanges of the United States and
Europe seem to be on a course of consolidation, largely driven by
the need of the large firms and institutions that control order flow
to reduce transaction costs. The result won't look much like the
traditional exchanges that have existed since the nineteenth cen-
tury. They will be electronic exchanges, and they win not be con-
fined to national borders. They will be order-driven, in the sense
that buy and sell orders or investors will be capable of being
matched, although liquidity may be enhanced by NYSE-like spe-
cialists, at least for less active stocks. Finally, they will no longer be
membership organizations, but will be business corporations, per-
haps publicly owned, probably controlled by the international in-
vestment banks that control a large part of the flow of customers'
buy and sell orders.
Despite the evident trend of the world's stock exchanges to
consolidate, the appearance of a world stock exchange in the fore-
seeable future is by no means inevitable. Such a unitary market
would require the participation and leadership of the two largest
markets, NYSE and Nasdaq, both of which have trading systems
that are basically incompatible with the leading European markets.
The NYSE still uses an open outcry trading system, whereas the
European markets are electronic; the NASD has a quote-driven
system, whereas the leading European exchanges have order-
driven systems. Because powerful constituencies in the governing
structures of both of the U.S. markets-principally their specialists
and market-makers-continue to resist change, a single interna-
tional market for the world's leading stocks may be long in com-
ing. Nevertheless, two recent developments-the move toward
demutualization of the principal U.S. stock markets and the acqui-
167 See Tradepoint, supra note 48, at Rules 4.1,4.3,4.11, 4.12,4.20 (depicting the
specifications of the Tradepoint rules of responsibility for compliance and regu-
latory cooperation).
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sition of several NYSE specialist firms by large investment banks -
may erode the NYSE's resistance to change.
As to the regulation of the markets of the future, it is unlikely
that an international regulatory agency, with power to enforce its
rules, will come into existence any time soon. Nevertheless, the
difficulties inherent in coordinating different national rules and
regulatory systems will not stand in the way of the creation of a
world stock market. Despite the reluctance of national regulators
to cede any part of their sovereignty, any economically feasible
linkage of markets that is supported by the large international in-
vestment banks is likely to be implemented. The need for regula-
tion of a world market will be met by self-regulation, despite its
demonstrated shortcomings. Dependence upon self-regulation to
keep the markets honest and competitive, and to continue to retain
the confidence of investors, is likely to increase, if only for the ab-
sence of any feasible alternative to it.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss3/2
